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MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES RELATING TO THE
REMOVAL OF ICE AND SNOW FROM SIDE-
WALKS.
What is the principle upon which an abutter is compelled by
a municipal corporation to remove ice and snow from the side-
walk in front of his lot? Is it a simple exercise of the policc
power, or is it on account of the special benefit that the abutter
derives from the existence of the sidewalk ?
In his work on Muncipal Corporations, Judge Dillon says:
"The full conception of the true nature of a public street in a
city, as respects the rights of the public on the one hand, and
the rights of the adjoining owner on the other, has been slowly
evolved from experience. It has only been at a recent period
in our legal history that these two distinct rights have, sepa-
rately and in their relations to each other, come to be under-
stood and defined with precision."1  Perhaps it is on this
account that there exists some uncertainty as to these respec-
tive rights. In order to keep the discussion on the lines of gen-
eral principles, I propose to consider the question only with
reference to municipal corporations proper, leaving out the
cases of quasi-corporations having governmental duties, such as
counties and towns.
It seems that at common law there is no implied liability on
the part of municipal corporations for injuries resulting from..
unsafe streets. But where the charter confers upon a muni-
cipal corporation ordinary powers over streets within its limits,
the latter owes to the public the duty to keep the streets in a
reasonably safe condition for use in the usual mode by travel-
ers, and it is liable in a civil action for special injuries result-
ing from neglect to perform this duty. This is so, in the
absence of a Statute expressly imposing the duty and declaring
the liability, when (a) the street is one which it is the duty of
the corporation to keep in a safe condition; (b) which duty
must appear to rest upon the municipal corporation as such,
and not upon it as an agency of the State; (c) and when the
power to perform the duty, by authority to levy taxes or impose
local assessments for the purpose, is conferred upon the munici-
pality.'
Fourth edition, p. 777, Sec. 656 a.
2 Dillon Mun. Corp., Sec. 1017.
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It is of the essence of the street, says Judge Dillon,' that it
is public, and hence under the paramount control of the Legis-
lature as the representative of the public. The authority of
municipalities over streets they derive from the Legislature,
from charter or Statute. The fundamental idea of a street is
not only that it is public, but public for all purposes of free and
unobstructed passage, which is its chief and primary, but by no
means sole, use.
We may say, therefore, that the primary object for which
the legislative control is delegated to municipal corporations to
care for, supervise, and control streets, is to preserve for the
public free passage, and all the powers granted to local author-
ities must be exercised with this primary object in view. To
effect this, the corporate authority may control the laying of
gas, water, and sewer pipes under the street; the placing of
telegraph and telephone poles, and the laying of railroad tracks
on the surface; may regulate the traffic on the streets by
making ordinances respecting wagons, carts, drays, etc.; and
may improve and grade the streets themselves.
The streets are for the use of all, and free to all, and it is
for the interests of all that the foregoing powers of control are
delegated to municipal corporations. But there is one class of
the public which, in addition to the interest it has in the streets
in common with the rest of the community, has a special
interest therein. This class is composed of the owners of prop-
erty abutting on the street, whom I designate, for convenience,
as abutters. Whether the fee of- the street be in the public or
in the abutter himself subject to the public easement, the
abutter has rights peculiar to himself, such as rights of access,
light, and air, which must be protected. Judge Dillon sums up
these rights as follows: Whether the fee of the street be in the
abutter subject to the rights of the public, or whether it be in
the public in trust for street uses proper, the abutter is entitled
to the benefit of the street for all uses except street uses proper,
subject to legislative and municipal regulations. Such rights
are property or property rights in the abutter which can only
be taken away by the Legislature on the condition of making
compensation. If the abutter owns the fee, his rights may be
said to be legal in their nature. If he does not own the fee,
these rights are in the nature of equitable easements in fee.'
From this short review of the subject, it is fair to conclude
that the position of an abutter with respect to the street to-
3 Sec. 683.
4 Sec. 723 c.
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which his lot is adjacent is the same as that of the general public,
with the exception that he has certain property rights apper-
taining to him in respect to his abutting realty, and he is, for the
same reason, subject to certain liabilities regarding the streets.
These liabilities seem to me to fall into two classes, viz.,
(a) those which attach in consequence of some special benefit
accruing to him through the position of his property on the
street, when some substantial improvement is carried out on
the street; and (b) those which attach, on the maxim sic utere tuo
ut alienum ,on izdas, when, by his wrongful act or .omission with
respect to his abutting property, some special injury results to
others.
The first class, which does not require extended discussion
here, includes special assessments made upon abutting owners
to meet the cost of street improvements. It is sufficient to say
that these assessments must not exceed substantially the value
of the special benefit accruing, any further burden being a tak-
ing of private property without compensation, i. e., due process
of law.'
The second class includes any nuisance, such as permanent
obstruction of the public highway, or any act or omission ren-
dering the highway unsafe or inconvenient for public use.
It is conceived that these two classes comprise all the
liabilities of abutters that are peculiar to them as such, and
that in all other respects the abutter stands, in his relation to
the public streets, in the same position as the rest of the com-
munity. For the general management and care of the streets
he is no more responsible than are other citizens. His duties
are limited to paying for special benefits and abstaining from
wrongful use of his property.
This brings me to the subject of this paper. Upon what
principle may a municipal corporation, endowed by its charter
with the care, regulation, and control of the streets within its
jurisdiction, compel, by ordinance, abutting owners to remove
ice and snow from the sidewalks adjacent to their lots?
The purpose of such an ordinance isof course, to effect the
removal of inconvenient and sometimes dangerous obstructions
as speedily as possible. But why should this public duty be
imposed upon abutters?
. The question was raised in Massachusetts many years ago,
and the validity of the ordinance was upheld by the Supreme
Court of that State in an opinion by Shaw, C. J.6
5Norwood v. Baker, S. C. Rep. Oct., 1898.
6Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 5o4; 28 Am., Dec. 259.
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Passing over some technical points of no importance here,
the chief objection raised to the ordinance was that it imposed
a tax or duty upon the citizens which was unconstitutional
because it was partial and unequal, and in contravention of
that fundamental maxim of our social system that all burdens
and taxes laid on the people for the public good shall be
equal.
The Chief Justice disposes of this objection as follows: The
ordinance does not levy a tax, but rather imposes a duty upon a
numerous class, a duty which falls equally upon every member
of that class. It is a police regulation, highly salutary to the
citizens of a populous and closely built city, and it is imposed
upon the class in question because it can most conveniently
and promptly perform it. The opinion continues: "Although
the sidewalk is part of the public street and the public have an
easement in it, yet the adjacent occupant is often the owner of
the fee, and generally has some peculiar interest in it and
benefit from it distinct from that which he enjoys in common
with the rest of the community. * * * The answer to the
objection of partiality and inequality is that the duty required
is a duty upon the person in respect to the property which he
holds, occupies and enjoys under the protection and benefit of
the laws, that it operates upon each and all in their turns,
as they become owners and occupiers of such estates, and it
ceases to be required of them when they cease to be holders
and occupiers. In this respect, it is like a land tax or house
tax."
This opinion sustains the validity of the ordinance upon the
ground that for the general good the police power may impose
upon a certain class of citizens the burden of removing a pub-
lic nuisance in which all classes of the community have an in-
terest, and which the peculiar class selected had not in any
way caused.
It is true that the court justifies the imposition partly on
the ground of the special interest the abutter has ih gaining
access to his house, cellar door, steps, etc. It would seem that
an ordinance would hardly be necessary to induce the owners
of houses to remove any inconvenience resulting to themselves
of the nature described in the opinion. Moreover, although
special benefit to a class may justify the imposition upon that
class of special taxation, it is a lovel reason for the application
of the police power. If an ordinance of this nature is to be
justified as an exercise of the police power, it must be on
.account of the public good and not the private benefit.
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In Illinois a different view is taken. The Supreme Court of
that State' considers that the abutter has no other interest ill
the street in front of his property than any other citizen of the
munieipality; and that the same is true of the sidewalk. - The
sidewalk is as much under the control of the municipality as is
the street itself. The owner of the adjacent lot is under no
more obligation to keep the sidewalk free from obstructions
than he is the street in front of his premises. "It will be con-
ceded that the citizen is not bound to keep the street in front
of his premises free from snow or anything else that might
impede travel, then upon what principle can he be fined for not
removing snow or other obstruction from the sidewalk in
which he has no interest other than what he has in common
with all other persons resident in the city? It is certainly not
upon the principle under which assessments are made against
the owner for building sidewalks in front of his property. The
cases are not analogous. Such assessments are maintained on
the ground that the sidewalk enhances the value of the prop-
erty, and to the extent of the special benefit conferred they are
held tobevalid. * * * The sidewalk * * * is as much a
public highway free to the use of all as the street itself, and
upon principle it follows the citizen cannot be laid under obli-
gation under our laws to keep it free from obstructions in front
of his property at his own expense, any more than the street
itself, either by the exercise of the police power, or by fines
and penalties imposed by ordinance, or by direct legislative
action."
In a later case in the same State," an attempt was made to
induce the court to overrule the last mentioned decision, on
the ground that the ordinance was a proper police regulation.
But the attempt failed, the court saying: "Even the police
power, comprehensive as it is, has some limitations. It cannot
be held to sanction the taking of private property for public
use without making just compensation therefor, however essen-
tial this might be for the time to the public health, safety, etc.
And upon like principle, a purely public burden cannot be laid
upon a private individual except as authorized in cases to exer-
cise the right of eminent domain, or by virtue of proper pro-
ceedings to enfborce special assessments or special taxation."
The opinion then argues that ice and snow on a sidewalk may
be declared a nuisance, but if so, it is a public nuisance, and one
occasioned by natural causes and not by the action of the abut-
' Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 88 Ill. 554.8City of Chicago v. O'Brien, III Ill. 532.
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ter. The latter may have no more actual control of the street
than if his property were miles away; still he is held responsi-
ble for a result he could not control, and to the production of
which he did not even theoretically contribute. The court con-
cludes: "The gist of the whole argument is merely that it is
convenient to hold him responsible. It is not perceived why it
would not be equally convenient to hold him responsible for the
entire police government of so much of the street." The views
of courts as to the extent of the police power have changed
in recent years. The last mentioned decision was rendered in
1884, and it proceeds largely upon the assumption that the
police power cannot be exercised in the laying of a public bur-
den upon a private person without compensation to him. But
in x89o, the Court of Appeal of New York had occasion' to con-
sider the validity of a similar ordinance. In upholding it,
the court says: "Muncipal corporations have exercised this
(police) power, eo noinine, for time out of mind, by making
regulations to preserve order, to promote freedom of commu-
nication, and to facilitate the transaction of business in crowded
communities. Compensation has never been a condition of its
exercise even when attended with inconvenience or pecuniary
loss, as each member of a community is presumed to be benefit-
ed by that which promotes the general welfare."
It will be noticed that the court holds that compensation is
not a necessary element in the exercise of the police power.
And while this doctrine would seem to be correct in cases of
nuisances within the control of the party place(! under the bur-
den, it savors of hard justice to make him bear the conse-
quences of a state of things for which he is in no way respon-
sible.
It is worthy of notice that the opinion in this New York case
refers to Gridley v. City of Bloomington (supra) as follows:
"The argument upon which the opinion in that case rests is
that as the fee of the street was in the corporation and the side-
walk was a part of the, street, the lot owner had no more
interest in the sidewalk in front of his premises than any other
citizen of the municipality, because it was set apart for the
exclusive use of persons traveling on foot, and was as much
under the control of the municipal government as the street
itself."
This seems to be a somewhat incorrect statement of the
opinion in the Illinois case referred to. The exact words used
I Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 269.
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were: "The, public had an easement over the street in front of
the lot occupied and owned by defendant, and it makes no differ-
ence, so far as this decision is concerned, whether the fee of
the street passed by the plat and dedication to the corporation,
or whether it remained in the original proprietor." It cannot,
therefore, be said that the opinion rests on the fact that the
fee of the street was in the corporation.
I think it is clear that the only ground on which the ordi-
nance in question can be supported is that of the police power.
Is the police power properly available in this case? The prin-
ciple on which it seems to be admitted in the case under con-
sideration is that it is for the general convenience. No one
who has studied the matter can fail to be struck with the great
development of the ideas upon the extent of the police power
in late years. Up to a generation ago the police power of the
State, though theoretically extensive, was practically confined
to the prevention of any acts or the punishment of any omis-
sissions of a private individual which would result in injury to
the health, morals, or safety of Ahe general public. This of
course implies that the acts or omissions should be such as are
under the control of the party. But it is universally recog-
nized that the duty of keeping the streets in good condition
rests upon the public authority, and even when the validity of
the ordinance in question is sustained by the courts, it is held
almost unanimously that the public authority is not thereby
released from any liability for injury to a third party caused
by a failure on the part of the abutter to obey the ordinance."
In City of Rochester v. Campbell, Ruger, Ch. J., in upholding
this view, says: "Any other conclusion than that reached by
us would, we think, be most unfortunate, as it would tend to
relax the vigilance of municipal corporations in the perform-
ance of their duties in respect to the repair of streets and high-
ways, and impose that duty upon those who might be utterly
unable to discharge it. It would tend directly to demoralize
the public service and lead to disorder, decay and impassibility
of the public highways."
And in City of Hartford v. Talcott, Pardee, J., says: "The
individual owes no duty to the public in reference to the way
except to remove therefrom all property of his own which
obstructs it, and to refrain from doing or placing anything
10 City of Rochester v. Campbell, 123 N. Y. 4o5; Moore v. Gadsden, 93 N.
Y. 12; Kirby v. Boylston, 14 Gray 249; City of Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn.
526; Flynn vs. Canton, 40 Md. 312; Taylor v. R. R., 7 N. W. Rep. 728.
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thereon dangerous to the traveler. So far as defects in it result
wholly from the operation of nature, the proprietor at whose
front they exist is without responsibility for them. Therefore,
where ice has accumulated upon the sidewalk to a dangerous
extent, it is the duty of the municipality to remove or cover it
within a reasonable time after its formation." The court then
cites the charter authorizing the ordinance, and continues:
"The utmost reach of it is only to authorize the enactment of
an ordinance requiring each proprietor upon the way to assist
the city in restoring the walk to a condition of safety, with a
fixed and reasonable penalty for disobedience."
In Taylor v. Railroad, a Statute provided that the negligent
abutter should be liable to the city for any damages recovered
against it through his negligence. Judge Cooley, in deciding
that an action would not lie against an abutter by the injured
party for injuries resulting from failure to remove ice and
snow from the sidewalk, comments upon this Statute as follows:
"Exactly what force is to be given to the provision of the Stat-
ute that the lot owner shall be liable to the city for all damages
which the city may be compelled to pay for his default, we need
not consider in this suit."
Thus it will be seen that, while it is generally held that a
municipal corporation may delegate to the abutter the duty of
clearing ice and snow from the sidewalk, it cannot discharge
itself from liability for any injury resulting from a failure to
perform the delegated duty.
It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that where the
duty is so plainly and confessedly a public one, its imposition
upon a certain class of citizens, however large, is the imposi-
tion of an unequal burden. The authors of "Municipal Police
Ordinances" " refer to the matter in these words: "While it
is clear that municipal corporations can prevent private indi-
viduals from obstructing travel on the streets by their own
acts, it is somewhat doubtful whether they have power to com-
pel adjoining owners to keep the sidewalks clear from snow so as
to be passable." After referring to the Illinois decisions, they
continue: "Though this view is in one sense correct,
still considerations of public benefit should overbalance any
slight inconvenience to the individual. * *- * Adjoining
owners are so situated as to be able to clear the walks in a short
time, and though a slight inequality of burden may fall upon
the citizens thereb y, such regulations ought to be sustained as
proper and reasonable police measures."
11 Horr and Bemis, Mun. Pol. Ord., p. 228, Sec. 235.
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Our conclusion must be, therefore, that these ordinances,
though avowedly imposing an unequal burden, are sustained as
a valid exercise of the police power on account of the general
convenience.
Thus the question narrows down to this: What is the extent
of the police power? On this point opinions of the present
day are by no means in harmony. Subject to constitutional
provisions, which are themselves capable of different interpre-
tations, the police power of a State is practically that which the
citizens of the State permit it to be.
As the dominant ideas of the rights of the public as against
individual rights or convenience change, so will the police
power change. An illustration of this may be found in the
legislation relating to intoxicating liquors. About forty years
ago it was decided in New York, in the case of Wynehamer v.
People, that Statutes prohibiting the manufacture and sale of
intoxicants were unconstitutional so far as they related to
liquors in existence at the time of the passage of the Statutes,
this being a deprivation of property without due process of law.
In 1887, a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States"
affirmed the validity of a Kansas Statute under which the
owner of a brewery, which was in existence before the manu-
facture and sale of intoxicating liquors were prohibited, was
compelled to suffer the loss of all his stock in trade without
compensation. His right to compensation was denied on the
ground that his business had become a nuisance, and as such
could be abated. A generation intervened between these
decisions on the scope of the police power, and public opinion
had in the meantime sanctioned an exercise of this power
which would formerly have been regarded as pure confiscation.
I cite these cases simply as illustrations of the flexible
character of the police power. It is not, therefore, surprising
to find that opposite views of the validity of its exercise in the
question under consideration should be held in different juris-
dictions. But on looking at the decisions and the principles on
which they rest, it is difficult to come to any other conclusion
than that of the Illinois court, in Chicago v. O'Brien, already
cited, viz.: "The gist of the whole argument is merely that it
is convenient to hold him responsible. It is not perceived why
it would not be equally convenient to hold him responsible for
the entire police government of so much of the street."
WILLIAM FREDERIC FOSTER.
12 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623.
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